utilitarian way, either by considering the social interactions or through the search for a rational solution in the case of focused dilemma.
One of the key characteristics of a person is his capacity to be responsible towards others. A responsibility which results from his involvement in a nexus of social re1ationships, out of which it is impossible for him to escape. AU types of relationship generate a series of rights, on one side, and associated obligations, on the other side, which express the person's level of responsibility towards the others. This can be formally represented by a specific tool: the right and obligation map (ROM) .
In his regular search for happiness, the person's consciousness of responsibility may enter an internaI conflict. Searching for his individual. pleasure on one side may not be compatible with.. satisfying his social obligation. A balanced solution between responsibility and happiness has to be found. Therefore he can consciously adjust his level of responsibility, by prioritising the various obligations, but this adjustment has to appear reasonable. He must keep in mind that any of her actions have to look reasonable for the others. Such an attempt to conciliate responsibility and happiness leads naturaUy to a refusaI of the simple criteria of satisfaction that the utilitarian philosophy considers. It implies to refer to another type of ethics, the ethics ofjoy and happiness.
The Right and Obligations Map (ROM): A FormaI
Representation of Responsibility A person is normaUy embedded in various social networks, or in institutions, which give him rights but also impose obligations based on reciprocity. A. Sen (1981) already discussed this issue when he discovered that famines occur in situations where enough food is available to feed the whole population but remains stocked. He deve10ped his analysis of entitlements to explain the surge of the famine. However, this explanation did not fit in weIl when analysing the 1972 Sahelian famine; despite a situation of starvation, the rate of mortality was much under the level it was supposed to be (Caldwell J. and Caldwell P. 1987) . In fact, the distribution of rights and obligations among family relatives, between urban and rural areas, allowed adequate transfers, which helped overcome the situation. But, these rights, and their related entitlements, could only be used once the obligations were fulfilled (Mahieu 2001) .
This relation between rights and obligations can be formalised by introducing a specific entitlement tool: the Rights and Obligations Map (ROM). Each person has his own ROM, which defines the set of obligations he is subjected to and the potential rights he disposes of, according to his age and sex, the role played within the family and the social status at a given date.
Two types of relationships are represented by the ROM. First, the family links, or vertical relationships, which are based on the lineage--system -(patrlarehy, . matriarchy, etc.). They are usually the most intensive and oppressive ones. Second, the horizontal relationships which express the mutual aid that exists between ..' -age groups, community groups, social networks, and-which can be used to complement the lineage authority. Both relationships generate rights and obligations based on political, economic, religious and other foundations. On such a map, the Y -axis of the diagram represents the intergenerational balance of rights and obligations by showing the opposition between younger and older people. On the X-axis, the range beyond zero represents the intensity of rights, in positive terms, and the amount of obligations, in negative terms (see graph. 1).
The diagram can be used to analyse various situations. For instance, if obligations are totally balanced by rights, in the long run, the distribution of points will be symmetrical. A nonsymmetrical distribution appears when the amount of obligations exceeds that number of rights, especially between generations. This is the case for the points in the "South-West" quarter of the diagram, which represent the situation of the youngest having many obligations towards older people, either through tradition (as in the developing countries) or by law (the pension system in the developed countries). Therefore, the younger generations can be considered as a "sacrificed generation", once compared to others. However, this may change over time, during their life cycle, and the "once sacrificed generation" may then become, a few years later, a "Iost generation" (for it may become spoiled by affluence and power).
Everybody has to fulfil obligations towards the community in order to benefit from rights. Obligations are usually expressed by constraints on time and resources. Resources cover the transfers of money or goods to the original village and the aid to the members of the community living in urban areas. Time obligations include visits to parents, attending funerals, participation in collective work, etc. For a given level of obligations, time and money may become substitutes. For instance, sending money for ftmerals or the required goods to parents can compensate being unable to attend and to give time to support the family. AIl these events are captured through the use of targeted surveys which measure the community pressure on personal income and time allocation.
Substitution between time allocation and transfer of goods can be formalised, in economic terros, by indifference curves of obligations, such as those presented in graph. 2. Each curve expresses, for a given person, the level of obligations based on his douôle allocation of time and expenses on goods. More generally, the final balance betWeeil amounts of time, money, goods, and caring relationships, is a function ofthe way in which a person is imbedded in community reJationships. It depends on the community's preference for this person.
While facing obligations on one hand, the person has aiso potential rights, on the other, which means that he can use these rights later on, when need be. The effective ability to exercise these rights depends, amongst other things, on how the person respects his obligations towards the community. Sorne rights can be considered as ftmdamental for they are related to a social position in the community, to the protection frOID evil forces and to survival in case of disasters. Rights are circumstantial and concem access to assets, goods and services, e.g. access to the land managed by the cornrnunity, to children's fosterage, to help for fieldwork, and cash money or gifts in the case of funerals. Having such a set of rights is an ihsurance against actual or potential difficulties. In West Africa, for instance, subscribing to mutual benefit pools such as the "tontines" enables one to receive collective help in the event of fmancial trouble.
Positive Ethics in Economies
The main issue, for a given person, stands in the balance between the number of rights and obligations. At the interpersonallevel, reciprocal obligations can be analysed, in theory, with the c1assical Edgeworth box. In practice, rights and obligations may be difficult to compare due to their different substance and content. Obligations often materialise by flows of goods in real terms, while rights remain frequently a potential which can only be mobilised within community. It becomes difficult to set up a balance at the personal leve1, for it will depend on the relationship between the person and his community .
Moreover, rights and obligations vary according to the socioeconomic status of its members. For in~tance, the "fust born" of a family and the "oIder brother" are more strongly subjected to obligations than other members. On the other hand, they also have more rights. But, since these remain potential, they may in the short-term be overburdened by obligations and be unable to compensate the corresponding expenses with their current resources. By contrast, those who are lower down in the family hierarchy may be never obliged to return, in one way or another, the small benefits they get from their position.
Other distortions or difficulties may appear within this obligation-right pattern, through urban-rural relationships and intergenerational exchanges. For instance, the flows of given goods are usually directed from the village to family members in the urban areas. The village comrnunity compensates for this by giving potential rights to land, fosterage for children, and stocks of supplies once the harvest completed. But this may not be sufficient to equitably compensate the efforts made by the urban members for this particular community.
Meanwhile, such relationships generate social capabilities, Le. abilities to generate social incorne (e.g. transfers), investment in social rnatters and social capital through reciprocity. These constitute "altruistic resources", which depend on the person's ,--
In praetice, the capacity of a person to behave in a purely egoistic way is quite limited since he lives in a social environrnent that imposes limits and defines his set of associated rights and obligations. No one can deny this situation and effectively avoid it. This is as true in developed countries as it is in developing countries. However, since the legal social security system (e.g. system of family support, health insurance, retirement pension, old age assistance, etc.) is more extended in developed countries, the importance of the traditional pattern of rights and obligations is normally less. Either way, the best solution is to adapt to the constraints of the social environrnent through thinking and appropriately reflecting upon actio~_s~... ResponsiQility thus informs adaptive preferences and this may even help, through the use of the "affiliation capabilities", to revise the set of obligations without rupture in the social capacity to co-operate.
To summarise, by adapting his preferences, the person will look for a balance between his egoistic and altruistic attitudes. In a context of scarce resources, he will have to adapt according to the corpus of social norms, which defines his responsibility, using assets such as time allocation or intergenerational transfers. In this way, the moral and economic constrains should fit together.
Another question remains: to what extent is a person's quest for happiness compatible with others' quests ofhappiness?
First, this takes us back to the capacity of relating to others, to participate in others' happiness. M. Nussbaum (2000) considers the capacity for reciprocity as part of the "affiliation capabilities" that she describes in her centrallist of capabilities, Le. "to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation". R. Misrahi goes further, in his ethics of joy and happiness, by demonstrating that higher levels of happiness are a deeply thought construct which cannot be reached without a strong reciprocallink to others. In the European continental philosophieal tradition of phenomenology, priority is always given to responsibility, which is considered as an ex-ante phenomenon related to the social context. It induces a self-constrained responsibility, based on the Kantian golden mIe "behave as you would like others to behave". It is not, as in the Rawlsian tradition, an ex-post concept. It leaves the person a certain degree of freedom through his capacity to adapt, or to counter-adapt, his set of preferences (Elster 1983 ).
An extreme case of an infinite responsibility is given by E. Levinas (1983) (for intragenerational responsibility) and H. Jonas (1979) ( for intergeneraHonal responsibility). In both cases, the person has limited freedom. For E. Levinas, priority is always given to the other and makes it necessary to sacrifice personal freedom to ensure the happiness of others. For H. Jonas, the "precautionary principle" sets the priority . It ensures that future generations won't suffer from decisions taken by the present generation. For both authors, the priority of the others' happiness makes responsibility supersede freedom.
A different, and intermediary answer, is given by P. Ricoeur (1995) , who admits neither the mIe of infinite responsibility, nor the short-term egoistic view of utilitarianism. He defines, as a primary capability, the capacity of a person to impute responsibility on his CUITent actions. This is a capacity of "imputatio", which expresses the ability to freely assume finite actions and recognize the corresponding impacts on others.
Mostly, obligations need to be fulfilled before rights can be exercised. This shows the relevance of the "imputatio" theory of responsibility and through it "multiple realisability" in various contexts. Happiness still remains the synthesis of joy's events. But it has to be constructed within the framework of a selfconstrained freedom, where preferences on finite actions are adapted to fit in with the dominant context.
On the Ethics of Joy and Happiness
According to R. Misrahi (2003) , actions originate from human desire. Desire is a drive and an intrinsic part of human nature, which gives value to aIl things. Within this desire, there is freedom for choices including the choice to generate joy.
The desire can lead to the sole search of spontaneous individual hedonistic pleasure, but this will be too narrow a view, since we are aU embedded in social networks. Our spontaneous desire will inevitably encounter the desires of the others. Differences in desires, whether perceived or real, generate resentment, conflicts and violence. This is a common experience ofhumanity.
But the human being, i.e. R. Misrahi's Subject, is able to perceive the others consciously. He has the capacity to "project hiroself on the other as a mirror", i.e. to imagine the situation of another, the risk of conflict when the respective desires do not match, and even to have compassion. As such, it is possible to avoid violence and conflicts, to define rational exchanges wough the setting up of agreements and contracts according to which one will give something and receive the equivalent in exchange. This is the juridical expression of reciprocity based on a reciprocal recognition of the other. From this, a new form of ethics can be generated: not based on the usual ethos of pleasure _ of spontaneous pleasure since this is often inconsistent with reality -but on an ethos of deeply thought out joy.
